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John Stuart Mill said of proper names that they are 
" . . . not connotative; they denote the individuals who 
are called by them, but they do not indicate or imply 
any attribute as belonging to those individuals."1 The 
sole semantic function of names on this view is to de-
note an individual, not to say anything about that in-
dividual. It follows from this that two proper names 
which refer to the same individual are semantically 
equivalent. The only semantic function they perform is 
exactly the same. One consequence of this is that co-
referring names can be substituted in a sentence 
without changing what the sentence expresses. Let us 
henceforth call the thesis that co-referring names can 
be so substituted the substitutivity thesis. 
Gottlob Frege held a view much like Mill's in his 
earlier work.2 He rejected it, however, at least in 
part because he was convinced that the substitutivity 
thesis created insuperable problems in accounting for 
certain data of cognitive significance.1 In this paper 
I shall begin by very briefly considering a Fregean ob-
jection to the substitutivity thesis. I shall then ar-
gue that the objection does not give us good grounds 
for rejecting the Millian thesis. I shall do so by of-
fering an analysis of belief that allows us a plausible 
interpretation of the Fregean data that is consistent 
with a Millian position on proper names and substitu-
tivity. 
I. The Fregean Objection 
The Fregean objection I am considering can best be seen by way of example. "Cicero" and "Tully" are, Quine assures us, different names of the same person. That means, according to the eubstitutivity thesis, that substituting one name for the other in a sentence will not change what the sentence in question expres-ses. Thus 
(1) Tully is an orator 
and 
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(2) Cicero is an orator 
say the same thing, or express the same proposition. 
It seems obvious that it is possible for a person to 
believe (1) without believing (2). But inasmuch as the 
objects of belief are not sentences but the proposi-
tions expressed by sentences, it is the proposition ex-
pressed by (2) [hereafter, p(2)] that is believed while 
p(l) is not believed. But that should be impossible on 
the substitutivity thesis. According to it, p(l) and 
p(2) are identical. To believe p(2) just is to believe 
P(l). 
II. The Independence of Semantic and Cognitive Consid-erations 
Howard Wettstein, who advances a basically Millian 
view of proper names, has recently proposed an in-
teresting approach to the Fregean problems of cognitive 
significance.* He has suggested that these problems 
ought not to be seen as semantic problems. While he 
elaborates a construal of the semantic enterprise which 
I shall not consider here, his suggestion can usefully 
be appropriated as a thesis about the independence of 
the reference of proper names from the cognitive sig-
nificance of those names or of the sentences in which 
they appear. 
Wettstein argues that there is no reason to suppbse 
that a thesis about the reference of proper names en-
tails anything about the cognitive significance of 
those names. A theory of reference, on his construal 
of semantics, has to do with a relationship between 
language and the world, whereas cognitive problems in-
volve a relationship between the mind and language or 
perhaps the mind and the world. Two names might co-
refer and thus on the Millian view be semantic equiva-
lents, and yet the way in which a person thinks about 
their common referent may be very different depending 
on which word he is using. Analogously, two sentences 
containing such co-referring names might similarly ex-
press the same proposition despite the fact that a par-
ticular person has widely different cognitive perspec-
tives on it. 
Wettstein claims that this independence between 
cognitive and semantic considerations allows us to see 
that while "cognitive puzzles" of the sort I mentioned 
above are phenomena in need of explanation, they ought 
not to pose a problem for one's view of reference. The 
sort of explanation they require is not a semantic ex-
planation but a cognitive one. Thus (1) and (2) might 
in fact express the same proposition while the way in 
which a given individual cognizes that proposition may 
vary greatly depending on whether the proposition is 
expressed by (1) or by (2). So the Millian can accept 
without qualms the intuition that sentences (1) and (2) 
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individuate different cognitive or mental states with-
out the semantic thesis that the "Cicero" and "Tully" 
sentences both express the same proposition. 
While Wettstein's general claim that cognitive mat-
ters are independent from reference seems plausible to 
me, it does not obviously follow from that claim that 
the substitutivity thesis is invulnerable to criticism 
on cognitive grounds. Recall the Cicero-Tully puzzle. 
If the substitutivity thesis is true, then co-referring 
names should be interchangable salva veritate in 
sentences. But it seems obviously possible that 
(3) S believes that Cicero is an orator 
is true, and 
(4) S believes that Tully is an orator 
is false. Since "Cicero" and "Tully" are co-referring, 
the substitutivity thesis requires that p(3) and p(4) 
are identical. But that seems obviously false, since 
they apparently have different truth values. We seem 
to have a counter-example to a semantic thesis based 
solely on cognitive considerations.5 
So even if, as Wettstein plausibly suggests, a the-sis about reference need not imply any account of cog-nitive matters, there nevertheless remain serious pro-blems for the substitutivity thesis that require only cognitive assumptions.' These problems, moreover, can be adequately addressed only by further analyzing the nature of belief. It is to that enterprise that I now turn. 
III. Kripke's Account of the Puzzle 
Saul Kripke has argued that a puzzle about belief 
similar to the puzzle we saw in the "Cicero-Tully" case 
can be shown to arise without making any assumptions at 
all about substitutivity.7 One case he considers 
requires only that we accept the common-sense disquota-
tional principle; for any appropriate English sentence 
p~, "Tf any English speaker, on reflection, sincerely 
assents to *p', then he believes that p."' 'P', of 
course, cannot be a sentence containing pronominal or 
indexical elements that would weaken the intuitive 
force of the disquotational principle. Thus, for exam-
ple, I cannot validly infer from someone else's sincere 
utterance of "I am hungry" that he believes that I am 
hungry. 
Kripke constructs the following case.' Peter 
learns the name "Paderewski" with an identification of 
Paderewski as a famous pianist and, not surprisingly, 
assents to "Paderewski had musical talent." From this 
we can infer, using the disquotational principle, that 
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(5) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent. 
Later, in another context, Peter learns of a Polish 
national leader named "Paderewski." Peter does not 
know that the musician and the statesman are the same 
person and believes that statesmen are rarely possessed 
of musical talent. Thus, he assents to "Paderewski had 
no musical talent." From this we can infer, again us-
ing the disguotational principle, that 
(6) Peter believes that Paderewski had no musical talent. 
We conclude, therefore, that Peter has contradictory 
beliefs. But this conclusion seems counter-intuitive 
in view of the fact that no amount of logical acumen 
will enable Peter to eliminate the contradiction. But 
a straightforward contradiction is the sort of thing 
that is usually transparent even to a person who is 
completely ignorant of formal logical rules. 
By strengthening the disguotational principle only 
slightly we get even more surprising results. The 
strengthened disguotational principle18 adds to the 
disguotational principle the provision that "If a nor-
mal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely dissents 
from 'p', then he does not believe that p." It is 
really something like this strengthened disguotational 
principle that generated the Cicero-Tully puzzle. The 
disguotational principle itself gives us no rules for 
determining what a person does not believe but only for 
determining what he does believe. One could never con-
clude on the basis of it that a person did not believe 
p(l). For such a conclusion we need something like the 
strengthened disguotational principle. 
Now, let us change Kripke's example so that instead 
of Peter assenting to "Paderewski had no musical tal-
ent, " he dissents in the same situation from "Paderew-
ski had musical talent." From this we can infer, using 
the strengthened principle, that 
(7) Peter does not believe that Paderewski had mu-sical talent. 
But (7), of course, contradicts (5) and this is a con-
tradiction, not only in Peter's beliefs, but also in 
our own. The simple application of the strengthened 
disguotational principle to this case yields straight-
forwardly contradictory results. 
This, then, is the dilemma. Either we take Peter's 
sincere assent to and dissent from sentences to be a 
reliable guide to what he does and does not believe, 
which leads us to a contradiction, or we deny either 
(7) or (5) and so give up the assumption that Peter's 
assent and dissent is a reliable guide to his beliefs. 
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Let us consider the latter choice first. The 
strengthened disquotational principle is nothing like a 
necessary truth. 1 1 If, for example, 'p' is a sentence 
that the relevant English speaker misunderstands, his 
sincerely assenting to 1 p' is compatible with his not 
believing that p. Even if he knows that he does not 
understand 'p', he might still sincerely assent to it 
if he has it on good authority that 'p* is true. But 
what that tells us is, not that he believes that p, but 
that he believes that 'p' expresses a truth. But none 
of these problems with linguistic competence affect the 
"Paderewski" case. Peter understands what each of the 
relevant sentences means. There seems to be no good 
reason for denying that the strengthened principle ap-
plies to the "Paderewski" case without denying that it 
applies to any kind of case. But that seems a radical 
conclusion, since it seems that most of our judgments 
about what beliefs a person has or lacks depend cen-
trally on knowing the sentences to which he assents and 
those from which he dissents. But if we accept the 
strengthened disquotational principle for determining 
Peter's beliefs we are forced to the other horn of the 
dilemma. That principle commits us to a contradiction. 
There seems to be no escape. But inasmuch as the 
dilemma arises without making any assumption at all 
about substitutivity we should not look for the source 
of the problem in the substitutivity thesis. We should 
rather look, I suggest, at the way in which beliefs are 
ascribed, since the puzzle can be generated by making 
assumptions only about belief ascriptions. 
IV. A Proposed Solution 
We can, it seems to me, understand how such a pro-
blem arises and how it can be resolved by exploiting 
Wettstein's notion of a cognitive perspective.12 He 
pointed out that a person can believe or disbelieve a 
proposition from different cognitive perspectives, and 
that one's cognitive perspective may be independent of 
how a name refers and of what proposition a sentence 
expresses. What was not explicit in his discussion was 
the fact that whenever a person believes a proposition, 
he believes it from some cognitive perspective or 
other. Cognitive perspectives on propositions are in 
this sense analogous to visual perspectives on physical 
objects. Whenever a person sees an object, he sees it 
from some perspective. The same object can be seen 
from different perspectives, but can be seen only from 
some perspective or other. Likewise, the objects of 
belief, i.e., propositions, can be believed only from 
some perspective or other though they can be believed 
from more than one perspective. Whenever the two-place 
relation of belief obtains between a person and a prop-
osition, another three-place relation obtains among 
that person, that proposition, and a cognitive 
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perspective. In other words a person believes a propo-
sition just in case there is at least one cognitive 
perspective such that the person believes the proposi-
tion from that perspective. But just as an object can 
be seen by the same person from different perspectives, 
so the same proposition can be believed or disbelieved 
from different perspectives. A person will, for exam-
ple, be likely to have different perspectives on a 
proposition if he has different perspectives on the 
referent of proper names occurring in sentences ex-
pressing the proposition. An explicit recognition of 
this goes a long way toward solving Kripke's puzzle. 
It is not ordinarily necessary or useful to specify 
the cognitive perspective from which a proposition is 
believed or to distinguish it from other perspectives 
on the proposition. But making such distinctions will 
be very useful here. Keeping in mind this distinction 
between believing a proposition and one's perspective 
on the proposition, it is obvious that while it follows 
from believing a proposition that it is believed from 
some perspective, it does not follow that it is 
believed from all the perspectives one has on the 
proposition. Peter had two different cognitive per-
spectives on Paderewski and consequently two different 
perspectives on the proposition expressed by "Paderew-
ski has musical talent." He believed that proposition 
from only one of those perspectives. It should not be 
surprising that Peter believes its negation from anoth-
er perspective on Paderewski. His having contradictory 
beliefs initially seemed counter-intuitive because 
straightforward contradictions are normally transpar-
ent. It seemed therefore that only a minimal awareness 
of logic should enable Peter to recognize and correct 
the contradiction in his beliefs. Yet it was obvious 
that no level of logical expertise would be of any help 
to him. 
But now it becomes clearer how it is that Peter 
could have a contradiction among his beliefs of which 
he is not aware. He assented to the relevant sentence 
from one cognitive perspective on the proposition it 
expressed and assented to its negation from a different 
perspective on the proposition. From each of the two 
relevant perspectives on Paderewski, Peter is unaware 
that the musician is the same person as the statesman. 
These different perspectives on Paderewski. give Peter 
different perspectives on the proposition expressed by 
"Paderewski had musical talent." From one such per-
spective he is unaware that the sentence expresses the 
same proposition as it does from the other perspective. 
What follows from the application of the disquotational 
principle to this case is indeed that Peter believes 
both a proposition and its negation, but we can see now 
that the perspective on the proposition from which he 
believes it is different from the one from which he 
believes its negation. Since he is unaware that they 
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are perspectives on the same proposition, he is unaware 
that his beliefs are contradictory. Although his 
beliefs are contradictory they are not necessarily ir-
rational since the contradiction results from a lack of 
information rather than a deficiency in his logic. 
But what then are we to make of the strengthened 
disquotational principle? It yielded, as we saw, a 
contradiction in our own judgments about Peter's be-
liefs, a. contradiction, moreover, of which we were per-
fectly well aware. My suggestion in this case is that 
the strengthened principle no longer seems plausible if 
we are cognizant of the relation between cognitive per-
spectives and beliefs. Peter assents to "Paderewski 
had musical talent" from one perspective on the propo-
sition it expresses and dissents from the sentence from 
another perspective on it, though the sentence, in both 
cases, expresses the same proposition. According to 
the strengthened principle, Peter both believes and 
does not believe the same proposition. I suggest that 
we should conclude, not that he both does and does not 
believe the proposition, but that he believes it from 
one perspective and does not believe it from another 
perspective. This judgment is not contradictory. It 
should not even be particularly surprising in view of 
the fact that Peter does not know that these two per-
spectives are perspectives on the same proposition. To 
be sure, his beliefs are in some sense inconsistent, 
but he is not therefore irrational because the incon-
sistency results again from a lack of information 
rather than a logical deficiency. 
V. A Kripkean Objection 
Kripke says that it is no solution to the puzzle 
about belief to give an account of Peter's beliefs in 
some other vocabulary. There are, he suggests, some 
such descriptions of Peter's beliefs that are in some 
sense complete, but do not solve the puzzle because 
they do not answer the question, "Does Peter or does he 
not believe that Paderewski had musical talent?" 1 1 It 
might seem that I have offered just such an account. 
What I have said about Peter is that he believes from 
one cognitive perspective that Paderewski had musical 
talent and that he does not believe it from another 
perspective. Could we not still ask, "But does he . or 
does he not believe that Paderewski had musical tal-
ent?" 
Fortunately, my account can answer even that ques-
tion. Peter does indeed believe that Paderewski had 
musical talent. It is not the case that he does not 
believe it. An analogy will be helpful here. 
"Scroggins wears a ring" is true if there is at least 
one of Scroggins' fingers upon which he wears a ring. 
Now it might be true both that Scroggins wears a ring 
on his left ring finger and that he does not wear one 
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on his right index finger. Could a person not say in 
such a situation: "I know that Scroggins wears a ring 
on one finger and does not wear one on another finger. 
But the question remains, does he or does he not wear a 
ring?" Of course, Scroggins wears a ring. His wearing 
a ring requires no more than his wearing a ring on at 
least one finger. His not wearing it on another finger 
implies only that he does not wear a ring on that 
finger, not that he does not wear a ring. For that to 
be the case he must not wear a ring on any of his 
fingers. 
Similarly, Peter believes the proposition expressed 
by "Paderewski had musical talent" just in case there 
is at least one cognitive perspective from which he 
believes it. Since Peter believes that proposition 
from one perspective, he believes it. To be sure, he 
also does not believe it from another perspective. He 
even belies its negation from that perspective. But it 
is nevertheless false that he does not believe it. He 
does believe it, but the perspective from which he 
believes it is not the one from which he believes its 
negation. All that is required for him to believe a 
proposition is that he believe it from some perspective 
or other. Thus we cannot necessarily infer from his 
sincere dissent from a sentence expressing this propo-
sition that he does not believe it at all. It is safe 
only to infer that he does not believe it from his cur-
rent perspective. 
These insights allow us to resolve the cognitive 
problems for the Millian substitutivity thesis. That 
thesis, as we saw, entailed that substituting co-
referring proper names in declarative sentences does 
not change the proposition that such sentences express. 
This was a problem, first of all because such substitu-
tion in (1) and (2) seemed to make possible believing 
p(2) without believing p(l), which implied that p(l) 
and p(2) are not identical and that therefore the sub-
stitutivity thesis is false. Secondly, the substi-
tutivity thesis seemed obviously to be falsified by the 
substitution of co-referring names in belief reports. 
The thesis implied that (3) and (4) express the same 
proposition. Yet it seemed obvious that it was possi-
ble that p(3) and p(4) differ in truth value which im-
plied that they are not identical. 
Now we are in a position, however, to see that the 
cognitive assumptions behind the counter-examples to 
substitutivity are false. The reason that it seemed 
plausible to suppose that it is possible to believe 
p(2) without believing p(l) was that it seemed plausi-
ble to suppose that a person could sincerely assent to 
the former while dissenting from the latter. Now we 
can see that the previously unacknowledged inference 
from a person's dissenting to (1) to his not believing 
p(l) is fallacious. The same fallacy grounds our 
belief that (3) could express a true proposition while 
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(4) expressed a false one. The substitutivity thesis 
then remains unscathed by these objections, not because 
they are based on cognitive claims, but because those 
claims are false. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
I have said little that might convince a Fregean 
that my analysis of the relationship among cognitive 
perspectives, belief, and propositions is correct. He 
will have no trouble accepting the fact that Peter has 
more than one cognitive perspective on Paderewski. He 
will, however, claim that the sentence "Paderewski had 
musical talent" expressess a different proposition 
depending on which perspective the speaker or believer 
has on Paderewski. My point has not been to show that 
these cognitive data are inconsistent with a Fregean 
account but to show that they are consistent with the 
substitutivity thesis. I have not offered any argu-
ments against a Fregean account. I have sought only to 
eliminate one significant Fregean argument against the 
substitutivity thesis. I began the paper by observing 
what seemed to be some obvious facts about belief that 
contradicted the substitutivity thesis. I have argued 
that an appreciation of the significance of cognitive 
perspectives makes it plausible to hold that those ap-
parently obvious claims are false. 
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